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Abstract In continuing news, there is a growing
debate on whether current laws and regulations, both
in the US and abroad, need to be strengthened as they
relate to nanotechnology. On one side, experts argue
that nanomaterials, which are making their way into
the marketplace today, are possibly harmful to
consumers and the environment, so stronger and
new laws are needed to ensure they are safe. On the
other side, different experts argue that more regulation
will slow down the pace of business and innovation in
nanotechnology, or that self-regulation is the answer,
or other opposing positions. This paper will draw out
the core issues behind the debate and explain that
there is more at stake than merely environmental,
health and safety (EHS) worries or business interests,
as it first appears. We will also suggest an alternative
solution to stricter laws, since stricter laws would face
formidable practical challenges, even if they are
warranted.
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Whether or not current laws and regulations can
accommodate nanotechnology – a science that
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researchers as well as legislators are still trying to
understand – is a fierce debate that came to the
forefront last year with the January 2006 report by the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
(WWICS) that argued for stricter policies in the US
[1]. This paper will help make the debate more
understandable by laying out the major positions as
well as suggesting a simpler, more politically-feasible
alternative to stricter laws [2].
While the aforementioned report dealt exclusively
with US laws, the underlying debate is parallel to
ongoing investigations around the world; the concern
is the same. Because this paper does not refer to any
particular law or regulation, our discussion here can
be applied equally well to those investigations outside
the US.
Finally, the risks we address here are environmen
tal, health and safety (EHS) risks as opposed to, e.g.,
the risk that there is no democratic control over the
technologies, which does not appear as urgent as EHS
risks but nonetheless is an entirely separate issue
deserving of its own investigation [3].

The Stricter-Law Argument
While we have not yet seen anyone or any organiza
tion clearly articulate or formalize the argument for
stricter laws in nanotechnology, as opposed to
implying the argument, it can be characterized as the
following:

While more and more nanotechnology products are
introduced into the marketplace, some studies have
already suggested that engineered nanomaterials may
be harmful, for instance, causing brain damage in
animals [4]. As a specific example, the carbon
nanotube – a nanomaterial that consists of carbon
atoms precisely arranged, like connected Lego®
blocks [5], and is estimated to be anywhere from 20
to 100+ times stronger than steel of the same weight,
with chemical bonds stronger than that found in
diamonds – happens to resemble the whisker-like
asbestos fiber. This is troubling because the shape of
asbestos fibers is what makes them so difficult to
dislodge from one’s lungs. Further, nanoparticles are
so small, by definition, that they might easily and
undetectably slip into a person’s body and cells to
undetermined effects [6].
There are also unknown environmental impacts of
nanomaterials. Because they are created to be more
durable than existing materials, it begs the question of
how long they will persist in our landfills [7]. If
nanoparticles can be taken up by cells, as studies have
shown, then they could slip into our food chain and
eventually to us – which conjures up the related
scenario of food poisoning from shellfish that had fed
on toxic algae and other lessons in bioaccumulation,
e.g., involving the pesticide DDT [8]. Again, the
effects of nanoparticles on our biology are still
unknown, so food poisoning may be the least of our
worries, with genetic damage and death as other
possibilities [9].
So the problem is this: for many people, it seems to
be commonsensical that if there are real questions
about the EHS impact of nanotechnology products or
any other product, then we should investigate them
further before these products enter our marketplace.
Society has learned that from past lessons involving
such hazardous products as asbestos or lead paint or
DDT into the public space.
Of course, there are laws and regulations already in
place that – in theory – should prevent harmful
products from ever reaching the marketplace, such as
the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) and Occu
pational Safety & Health Act (OSHAct) in the US.
But are these laws really equipped to handle nano
technology? We will not attempt to make that
determination here, particularly given the comprehen
sive analysis offered by the WWICS report and
subsequently by other organizations [10], but we will

point out that there is good-faith reason to believe that
current laws are not perfect, which suggests a real
possibility that they cannot account for the nano
materials in question.
Even if one doesn’t know much about the relevant
laws, it is understood that laws are created based on
the available facts and circumstances of the time and
foreseeable future. They continue to evolve, be
refined and even be repealed over time, as it should
be. And given how little we know about nanotech
nology – but that we know nanomaterials have novel
and unpredictable properties – it would be difficult to
see why we should expect current laws to not need
updating (or an overhaul) as we learn more about
nanotechnology. At any rate, it’s better to be safe than
sorry, i.e., to be open to the possibility that we need
stricter laws rather than to risk damaging our health
and environment, or so the “stricter-law” argument
goes.
At this point, the argument would conclude that it
must be a failure of current laws, such as those in the
US, to prevent such products from entering the
marketplace, since if there are serious and continuing
questions about a product’s safety, then commonsense –
or some version of the Precautionary Principle, which
we will discuss later – would require the product is not
released into the marketplace until its safety is more
convincingly established.
In the case of the 2006 WWICS report, the
recommendation is to strengthen existing laws and
regulations as well as to enact new ones. The report
also provides an analysis of the legislation relevant to
nanotechnology, including: the Toxic Substances
Control Act, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and the major
environmental laws such as Clean Air Act, and
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Again, in
this paper, we will not look at that analysis to
determine whether or not these acts really are
equipped to deal with nanotechnology, but we will
focus more on the supporting reasons behind the
(implied) arguments to evaluate their soundness and
consistency.
Calling for stricter laws, of course, is not the only
possible response to the alleged failure of current
laws. Some have already proposed a moratorium or
full ban on nanotechnology research and products
until EHS risks are better understood and mitigated as
needed [11]. We will also not investigate this

particular position here, since if the argument for
stricter laws cannot be defended, then it seems
unlikely that an argument for a moratorium, which
we take to be a significantly more extreme position,
can also be defended. Further, the lack of support for
a moratorium, other than from the few groups that
have proposed it, may indicate that this position is an
over-reaction, all things considered – again, so the
stricter-law argument might go.

Learning from History
If the stricter-law argument sounds a bit far-fetched or
paranoid, we can look at recent US history to see
where our laws have failed us in protecting the public,
including industry workers, from commercial hazards.
There does not need to be an elaborate conspiracy
theory that such laws had been poorly designed,
perhaps as a result of misinformation, corporate
influence or political haggling. Rather, it is a plain
fact that people are fallible, both scientists and
legislators alike, especially when it comes to predict
ing the future – in this case about the adequacy of
existing regulations to protect the public and the
safety risk posed by new materials.
Asbestos, lead paint and DDT are frequently-cited
case studies, as well as diet drug “fen-phen” and other
pharmaceuticals. In each case, these materials made
their way into the marketplace and into our homes,
only to be discovered later that they are hazardous to
our health and/or environment. However, one can
object that these incidents, having occurred years or
decades ago, are an unfair comparison to today’s risk
in nanotechnology. It may be offered in defense of
current regulations that we have since evolved our
laws and our thinking to more rigorously test new
products, ever mindful to prevent such incidents from
occurring again.
But why should we believe the evolution of our
product and environmental safety laws have reached
an end point now? Are we really that clever as to have
finally created a system of safeguards to protect us
from every conceivable EHS risk? Rhetorical ques
tions aside, the following is a current example of the
apparent failure of EHS regulations in 2006 alone.
Just last year, the US Environmental Protection
Agency urged companies, including DuPont and 3M,
to phase out their use of a chemical (Perfluoroocta

noic Acid, or PFOA) used to make Teflon®, the non
stick material found in everyday items such as
cookware, carpeting, clothing, food packaging and
thousands of other products [12]. In use for more than
50 years, the chemical is linked to cancer and organ
damage in laboratory animals. It is so ubiquitous in
our environment that it is now found in the blood of
nearly every American. One Teflon manufacturer has
already paid more than $100 million to settle lawsuits
from residents who live near its factory, including
claims of birth defects.
“The science on [Teflon] is still coming in, but the
concern is there, so acting now to minimize future
releases of PFOA is the right thing to do for our
environment and health,” explained an EPA official
[13]. Environmental watchdogs support the EPA
move, explaining: “It would be hard to imagine a
chemical that is more widespread in our environment.
It is found everywhere from babies in the womb to
whales in the ocean. And beyond that, it is indestruc
tible in the environment. It lasts forever” [14].
So given this current and apparent failure of US
regulations to discover or account for EHS risks posed
by Teflon – never mind other continuing controversies,
such as currently-available pharmaceutical drugs that
might unknowingly cause severe health problems – a
similar failure with respect to nanotechnology is not
just possible but highly plausible.
Of course, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect that
we can guarantee that commercial products, particu
larly emerging technologies, are completely safe. But
it seems backwards to release a product into the
marketplace and then conduct EHS testing needed to
answer basic questions surrounding the product. For
instance, there are continuing questions on whether
mobile phones may cause a generation of people to
have brain cancer, infertility or other health problems
[15]. Also last year, a group in Finland announced
that it is studying the effects of mobile phone
radiation on human skin, given that previous tests
have shown cellular shrinkage which may degrade
our bodies’ ability to filter out toxins and other
dangerous proteins [16].
As with Teflon, this is the exactly the kind of
scenario that we want to avoid by now discussing
regulation in nanotechnology. It would be a catastro
phe on many levels if mobile phones are shown to be
hazardous to our health, since we have already been
using such devices for more than a decade. If they are

hazardous, we would hope that risk would have been
caught by EHS processes designed to protect against
this contingency. But since real, basic questions are
still open surrounding mobile phones, as just one
product, many suspect that EHS regulations today
need to be repaired, independently of any special risks
posed by nanomaterials.
Returning to nanotechnology, the “commonsense”
we referred to in constructing the argument above has
been formally called the Precautionary Principle (PP),
and it is worth discussing here briefly, since it plays a
critical role in the argument. The PP, or at least one
version of it, essentially states: if an action might
possibly lead to an unacceptable consequence, then
we should refrain from that action until that risk is
mitigated [17].
As it applies here, the PP seems to dictate that if
introducing nanotechnology products into the market
place now might possibly lead to the unacceptable
consequence of serious harm to people or the
environment, then we should refrain from that action
until that risk is mitigated – in this case, by
implementing stronger laws and regulations. Note
that for the PP to work, the risk needs to be credible
and not just a bare or logical possibility. Given
previous and ongoing research, it is a credible claim
to say that, at best, we are uncertain whether nano
materials are safe, and at worst, there is good
evidence to show they are not.
In the case of the Teflon chemical, even though
studies have not definitively proven that it is harmful
to humans in the amounts present in our everyday
lives (otherwise a much stronger and immediate ban
perhaps would have been proposed), there is enough
data to suggest a real risk to the environment and our
health. So the EPA seems to be guided by the PP or
something similar in concluding that companies
should produce less of this chemical, in case that its
presence in consumer goods and in manufacturing
emissions is truly harmful. In other words, the EPA
decided that the best course of action is to err on the
side of precaution, even though a $2 billion-a-year
business is reputedly at stake [18].

(loosely) formalize the argument as the following set
of premises (P) and conclusions (C):
(P1) Some prima facie evidence exists that some
engineered nanomaterials may be harmful to
EHS interests.
(P2) Current laws may be inadequate in accounting
for EHS risks in nanotechnology (as a general
liability of any law that is now relevant to an
area that did not previously exist or was not
properly/fully considered during the legislative
or regulatory process).
(C1) Therefore, there is a possibility that nanotech
nology, as it advances and absent stricter laws,
may lead to EHS harms.
(P3) EHS harms are an unacceptable consequence,
especially since our laws and some govern
mental agencies exist specifically to protect us
from those harms.
(P4) Commonsense suggests we should adopt the
Precautionary Principle in this case, which
states that: if an action might possibly lead to
an unacceptable consequence, then we should
refrain from that action until that risk is
mitigated.
(C2) Therefore, we should refrain from allowing
nanotechnology to proceed without taking
some action to mitigate nanotech’s EHS risk.
(P5) We can mitigate nanotech’s EHS risk by either
enacting a moratorium or implementing stricter
laws.
(P6) A moratorium on nanotechnology research or
commercialization has limited support and may
be an over-reaction, so it is not a viable or
reasonable option.
(C3) Therefore, the action we should take, if we
want nanotechnology to proceed, is to imple
ment stricter laws.
There has been much debate over the conclusion of
the stricter-law argument. The objections, both actual
and possible, to that argument include the following,
in order of the weakest to strongest, as we see them:

Objections to the Stricter-Law Argument

(a) Ordinary Material Objection: Nanomaterials are
not any more harmful than other materials, so
they need no special regulations;

If we take the preceding as an accurate characteriza
tion of the stricter-law argument, then we might

(b) Status Quo Objection: Current regulations are
enough to safeguard the public from these
harms;

(c) Precautionary Principle Objection: The Precau
tionary Principle should not apply here, so the
entire argument that rests on it is flawed;
(d) Self-regulation Objection: Self-regulation, not
more governmental regulation, is the answer;
(e) Other Harms Objection: Stricter regulation
would stunt the growth of a nascent nanotech
nology industry;
(f) Future Harms Objection: More than the usual,
near-term economic harms cited in (e), there may
be more serious harms in the future if the
nanotechnology industry were hindered now; and
(g) Better-Us-Than-Them Objection: Increasing reg
ulation only puts that nation at a disadvantage
with others that may then develop and reap the
benefits of nanotech first;
Though some of these objections can be and have
been combined, we will consider each separately in
the following. The last few objections are the most
compelling, so we will spend more time on those
positions than others in our discussion.

(a) Ordinary Materials Objection
This objection asserts that existing laws and regu
lations are adequate to account for nanotechnology,
because nanomaterials are essentially the same kinds
of substances that we have been using for decades.
That is to say, a carbon nanotube is still only made up
of carbon, and nano-sunblock is still only made up of
zinc or titanium oxide – and these are materials that
current regulations have proven sufficient to handle.
In some cases, nanomaterials are simply much smaller
versions of the familiar thing. In other cases, they are
the same material with a different molecular arrange
ment. Therefore, we do not need stricter laws to
account for nanotechnology.
In fact, nanotechnology is something that has
arguably existed since the beginning of the world, if
not earlier: “Nanostructures – objects with nanometer
scale features – are not new nor were they first created
by man. There are many examples of nanostructures
in nature in the way that plants and animals have
evolved. Similarly there are many natural nanoscale
materials...catalysts, porous materials, certain miner
als, soot particles, etc. that have unique properties
particularly because of the nanoscale features” [19].

Analysis
In the formalized argument stated above, this objec
tion disputes either premise P1 or P2, or both, and
therefore conclusion C1 as well as the dependent
conclusions C2 and C3. However, the objection
seems scientifically naive at best and contradictory
at worst. First, it is precisely the different molecular
arrangement of the same materials that creates
different properties. In a certain arrangement, carbon
can be made into pencil lead and useful for writing; in
another arrangement, it is a diamond; in yet another, it
is a carbon nanotube that, for example, is useful in
building lighter cars or aircraft. Therefore, it is not so
much the issue that nanotechnology works with
common materials, but rather that by manipulating
these materials at the nanoscale, we can create
uncommon results – results that today’s laws and
regulations could not have anticipated.
Second, it is not just the molecular arrangement
that gives nanomaterials their unique properties; it can
also be their size. For instance, aluminum is often
considered an everyday, safe element, e.g., soda cans
are made from it. But if aluminum is ground up fine
enough into dust, it can spontaneously combust in a
highly energetic reaction with air. Further, nano
particles are, by definition, so small that existing air
and water filters would be unable to prevent their
escape from manufacturing facilities – opening the
possibility for toxic emissions that affect workers and
the outside environment [20].
Given their size, nanomaterials may also be able to
slip by current methods of testing for safety and
health risks. In other words, current regulations that
require such testing may not be enough, if the testing
methods they require cannot catch nanosized materi
als. Recognizing this challenge, researchers at UCLA,
for instance, last year announced devising a new
approach to nanotoxicology [21].
Finally, the Ordinary Materials Objection also
seems to be a case of “wanting to have your cake
and eat it too.” The allure of nanotechnology in the
first place is that the materials we are creating have
novel and useful properties that we are still trying to
understand and exploit. So it would be inconsistent to
say that these nanomaterials are nothing special that
we need to worry about, when the entire point is that
they are extraordinarily special. As something special
and unpredictable, it would be reasonable to think that

they might be more (or less) hazardous or toxic that
ordinary materials of the same element or chemical –
which is exactly the concern that is prompting calls
for more regulation.

(b) Status Quo Objection
This objection to the stricter-law argument asserts that, as
a matter of fact, current regulations are enough to
safeguard the public from these harms. They have served
us well over the years, and without definitive proof that
nanomaterials are actually harmful in consumer products
or manufacturing, it is premature to subject the nano
technology industry to more regulations.

Analysis
This objection disputes premise P2 in our formalized
argument, thereby throwing into question all con
clusions from C1 to C3. Our evaluation of this
objection has already been discussed in the preceding
section, where we pointed out that today’s controver
sy over Teflon, as just one example, shows that
current laws and regulations are fallible and probably
do not fully protect us from EHS risks in all consumer
products or their manufacturing.
Further, even if current laws are adequate to
account for nanomaterials in production today and in
the near future, the industry is still learning about the
science and working on new materials, and these
materials may slip past existing laws. Either way, it is
also prudent to believe that the processes we have
established to regulate business in general are
imperfect and will continue to be a work in progress,
as long as businesses and research organizations
continue to innovate. Therefore, we should be open
to the possibility that current laws and regulations are
not enough, particularly when the consequences of
their failure may be catastrophic. This objection,
therefore, does not appear to be defensible against
the stricter-law argument.

(c) Precautionary Principle Objection
This objection maintains that the Precautionary
Principle (PP) is not an obviously-correct or com

monsense rule that we should follow, and therefore
the stricter-law argument falls apart, since it depends
critically on the PP. The most serious criticism we
examine here is that the PP represents a risk-averse
strategy that is too conservative, at least as it applies
to the considered case of nanotechnology where the
EHS risk is still unclear [22].
Risk aversion, the argument goes, is not the only
workable strategy in life, business or politics. After
all, if Americans never took unnecessary or perhaps
unreasonable risks, then we never would have
accomplished such things as expanding the country
westward to California, inventing the airplane and
putting a man on the moon. In fact, America was built
on the backs of explorers and frontiersman, such as
Christopher Columbus and Captain John Smith, who
risked and sometimes lost everything. And many
other nations can say similar things about their
forebearers, pioneers and inventors.
Such may be the case with nanotechnology: it is a
new frontier in science that, while admittedly contains
unknown danger, also holds much promise. However,
if we were to follow the PP, we may lose a great
opportunity to develop a science that has been called
“the Next Industrial Revolution” [23].

Analysis
This objection attacks premise P4 in the formalized
argument, evoking powerful emotions of national
pride and adventure, so it may appeal to many.
However, it is unfair to compare our current debate
on strengthening laws relevant to nanotechnology
with, say, the Wright Brothers’ debate on whether
they should jump off a cliff on what amounts to a
bicycle-powered deathtrap, or with any of the other
situations cited above.
One reason is that the individuals associated with
above events, from Christopher Columbus’ crew to
Neil Armstrong, presumably had consented to such
risks. Their decisions more or less directly affected
only their own lives. But in our considered debate
surrounding nanotechnology, countless people may be
put at risk without their consent. Indeed, surveys have
shown that most Americans are unaware of what
nanotechnology is or have not even heard the word
before, so it would be impossible for them to give
informed consent anyway, even if asked [24].

The issue of rights might be relevant here. Our
basic human right to not be unjustifiably harmed
plausibly entails a right to not have one’s life
unjustifiably endangered or otherwise put at risk of
significant harm. That is, not only are we morally
barred from harming others without just cause, but we
should also not put others at risk of such harm or even
cause theoretical or statistical harm. Without their
consent to be subjected to such risk, ignoring the PP
in the case of nanotechnology may violate this right.
Of course, one possible reply to this is that by
participating in a democratic system such as that in the
US, we are in effect “consenting” to the outcomes of
elections, ballot propositions as well as any legal
actions of the leaders we elect. So if an elected
legislative body were to pass some measure or law
that runs contrary to the PP, then it can be said that we
had consented to such a decision by electing politicians
prone to such aggressive policies. If current laws and
regulations are allowed to stand as they are, that is a
decision by which the public must abide (or seek to
reverse through the established political channels).
However, political theorists have pointed out that
we cannot consent to unjustifiably lay down our lives
or submit to unreasonable harms, since that would
defeat the very purpose of government in the first
place [25]. So extending this line of reasoning to our
discussion here, it may be argued that we also cannot
consent or countenance policies that lead to harm to
our persons.
At any rate, it does not seem unreasonable to
suggest that if the stakes are high enough – as
apparently is the case with nanotechnology, where real
human and animal lives as well as the environment are
at risk – then minimizing risk should be a guiding
principle, rather than, say, the pursuit of profits,
adventure or glory. Individual actors may arrive at a
different conclusion, depending on their tolerance for
risk and what value they place on their own welfare.
But if the decision involves risking the welfare of
countless others, it may be irresponsible to not adopt
something like the Precautionary Principle – in which
case the stricter-law argument again survives [26].

(d) Self-regulation Objection
This position opposes more governmental regulation
as a way to mitigate EHS risks. Rather, it advocates

self-regulation as an alternative, such that if any
additional regulation is needed, it should be left up to
the industry to decide what measures are appropriate.
There are several reasons why this view is
attractive to many [27]. First, it promotes a smaller
governmental footprint in business and individual
lives, so it instantly appeals to libertarians and some
conservatives. Also, it may make more sense for the
nanotechnology industry, that presumably knows its
field the better than lawmakers do and have a real
stake in its work-processes, to devise and implement
any regulations, rather than some distant bureaucracy
whose edicts are inevitably borne from political
compromise. By monitoring one’s own work, selfregulation fosters a sense of responsibility within the
industry. Further, self-regulation seems to work, as
evidenced by any number of professional code of
ethics.

Analysis
A persistent criticism to the idea of self-regulation is that
it seems to let the proverbial fox guard the hen-house, or
in other words, there is a sizable conflict of interest [28].
Can we trust an industry – any industry – to make its
own rules when money is involved? Can they fairly
create processes that protect EHS interests of the
public, even at the expense of their own interests,
financial or otherwise?
Some have called it a pragmatic paradox to ask a
person or organization to obey the law and, at the
same time, be the law [29]. Because there is no real
separation between those enforcing regulations and
those subject to the regulations, the door seems to be
open for self-imposed regulations to be selectively
enforced and for potentially covering up illegal or
unsafe practices.
Of course, an enlightened company might see that
it is in their best interest to deliver only safe products,
since harming one’s own customers is counterproduc
tive to one’s reputation and business as well as opens
the company to possible litigation. But will every
company arrive at the same conclusion, ignore shortterm gains for long-term interests and follow the
rules? For self-regulation to work, nearly every
industry actor needs to comply, since all it takes is
one clever company to sidestep industry-imposed
regulations for possible catastrophe to occur, i.e., the

EHS risks may still exist and are not sufficiently
mitigated by self-regulation.
The diagnosis of why actors fail to cooperate even
though it is in their better interests to do so – also
known as a “Prisoners’ Dilemma” – is well covered in
literature [30]. As groups such as OPEC have shown –
whose members are notorious for ignoring their own
self-imposed quotas for oil production, even though
compliance gives them a means to control greater oil
prices – it is a real challenge to get organizations to do
what they have committed to, even if breaking that
commitment will make them worse off in the long
run.
Further, if governmental regulations are believed to
be imperfect because they contain political compro
mise, it is unclear why matters should be different
with self-regulation. An industry coalition is merely
comprised of companies, research organizations and
individuals of varying influence and interests –
collectively representing a government of sorts, albeit
a smaller and more direct model, with the same
tendencies and weaknesses.
In nanotechnology, the problem is worse, since there
is no single “industry” that encompasses all the possible
or even current applications in nanotechnology. Unlike
associations for architects, engineers, lawyers or med
ical doctor, there is no such group for nanotechnologists,
because their work and interests are so varied – cutting
across myriad industries and companies, from Applied
Materials to BMW to L’Oreal to Merck to Zyvex and
countless others. In fact, discussions about nanotech
nology are usually prefaced with the disclaimer that
“nanotechnology” itself is a misnomer and properly
should be “nanotechnologies” to reflect the different
lines of research and applications.
Given the above concerns, it is not apparent that
self-regulation is a more viable or desirable alternative
to governmental regulation. Further, we should note
that this objection does not dispute the soundness of
the stricter-law argument: it agrees that something
should be done to mitigate risk associated with
nanotechnology. That is to say, it does not dispute
any of the premises or logic in the formalized
argument. It does not even dispute any of the
conclusions, including C3 that mandates stricter laws;
rather, the objection merely prefers self-regulation to
governmental regulation.
Even if the reasons given for self-regulation over
governmental regulations are defensible, they appear

irrelevant to attacking the stricter-law argument;
therefore, the stricter-law argument survives this
objection. At most, the objection might highlight the
stricter-law argument, as formulated in this paper, as
incomplete: further argument is needed to show that
the stricter laws need to be mandated by government
agencies as opposed to by an industry coalition,
which would then be the point of attack for this
objection.

(e) Other Harms Objection
This objection, perhaps the most popular of the seven
considered, suggests that if stricter laws were im
posed, there would be unacceptable costs or harms to
the nanotechnology industry now. Few objectors have
specified these costs, but we can imagine what some
might be. If tougher regulation makes it more difficult
for a nanotechnology product to be delivered to
market, e.g. due to extended product testing cycles
or more comprehensive environmental impact reports,
then a business can reasonably expect to generate less
revenue over a given period, since they no longer or
won’t as quickly have that product on the shelves.
This also means businesses might not be able to
afford to keep the same number of researchers or
other employees on staff, leading to a loss of jobs.
Without as many active researchers – including those
in academic or other non-business labs, to the extent
that these new laws affect their work – nanotechnol
ogy will not advance as quickly as it might otherwise
have. And if other nations do not have the same
stringent restrictions that we do, the US may suffer a
real competitive disadvantage globally. (We will
discuss other potential costs later, but these seem to
be the primary ones associated with this objection.)
Indeed, a recent report from Cientifica argues that
today, even without the stronger regulations proposed,
the pace of funding, research and development in the
US is not fast enough to sustain business efforts and
compete with other nations [31]. The report warns
that not enough government spending in nanotech
nology is focused on areas of immediate commercial
impact. And accessing this funding is a slow process,
taking an average of 2 to 3 years before it even
reaches the lab. The report also finds that, as a
proportion of its gross domestic product, the Japanese
government spends three times as much on the

technology than the US does. As it applies to the
Other Harms Objection, this report would lend
defense to the claim that the nanotechnology industry
needs more support, not more hurdles that would slow
it down further.

Analysis
This objection disputes premise P3 in our formalized
argument above. By itself, it does not deny that there
may be EHS harms from nanotechnology (i.e., it does
not dispute conclusion C1), but it asserts that EHS
harms are not an unacceptable consequence if stricter
laws would cause greater harm, thereby questioning
conclusions C2 and C3.
The objection – that an action will have burdens
on the business side – is a common response to
nearly any proposal to introduce new tax or
regulations. For instance, a higher minimum wage
would mean that some businesses will need to spend
more on payroll and perhaps pass along that expense
to customers in higher prices. And considering that
some of these companies might be barely profitable,
it seems reasonable to predict that some may go out
of business. They simply cannot afford to spend
more, without somehow increasing revenue – and if
they knew how to do that, they probably would have
done it already. (Though even in hindsight, it is not
clear how many, if any, legitimate businesses have
closed as a direct result of paying a higher minimum
wage.)
But a loss of jobs and revenue by itself is not
necessarily a bad thing, if there are other redeeming
results. For instance, even if nanotechnology products
were allowed to reach the marketplace unhindered by
new or strengthened laws, their success would
inescapably cause other sectors and companies to
lose jobs, just as word processing software displaced
workers in the typewriter industry. A nano-paint
company whose products are more durable and
scratch resistant than traditional paint may likewise
displace competitors, so a loss of jobs and revenue by
somebody may be unavoidable. This is an illustration
of “economic Darwinism”, presumably a desirable
situation where new, better innovations and busi
nesses replace older, less efficient or less effective
ones. In the nanotechnology regulation debate, the
economic harms potentially caused by stricter nano

technology laws may be offset by the lives, animal
and human, that the stricter laws potentially save.
So while we can empathize with the Other Harms
Objection, it appears to be one-sided and ignores the
fact that there must be a tradeoff. Every proposal has
its costs, and there seems to a necessary downside for
somebody. But there is also an upside or benefits too;
otherwise, the proposal would have not been worth
making in the first place, even if there were no costs.
The challenge is not just to identify these costs, but
also to evaluate the costs and benefits to determine
whether the proposal is worthwhile overall.
For instance, we know that for every bridge or
skyscraper that is built, a certain number of construc
tion workers can be expected to die or be seriously
injured on that job. This is not a trivial concern – but
should it be enough to derail a bridge or skyscraper
project? We loathe to put a price tag on a person’s
life, such as in making a cold, utilitarian calculation of
lives lost versus economic benefits from the bridge.
But the fact is that such calculations must happen in
real-world projects.
As it applies to the issue at hand, the benefit of
stricter regulations is that we reduce the risk that
nanotechnology may pose to the public, industry
workers and the environment. Does reducing that risk
justify the potential loss of profit, jobs and compet
itive advantage in the nanotechnology industry?
Finding the answer to this question depends on
additional considerations: How much would these
new regulations reduce the risk – a substantial or an
incremental amount? How much burden exactly
would these regulations put on the industry? If we
could quantify likely and worst-case scenarios, how
many consumers might be harmed – and what kind of
harm – without new regulations, and how much
would the industry lose in jobs and profits? These are
questions that will require more research to answer,
although a common intuition might be that people
should be valued more than profits, no matter how
much is at stake for an industry – a point we will not
take up in this paper.
However, matters can quickly become more com
plicated without debating that point, when one
considers the role of rights in this discussion. If we
have a basic human right not to be unjustifiable
harmed and the government has an obligation to
protect its citizens (from internal and external threats,
including unsafe commercial products), then it seems

that stricter regulations are needed to protect this right
and fulfill the government’s obligation.
But on the business side, it is less clear what rights
would be violated by the introduction of stronger laws.
Do we have a right to the jobs that might be lost in
nanotechnology? Do businesses have a right to develop
products that are in compliance with existing laws (or is
there a corporate moral responsibility to employees and
customers, beyond what is required by law)?
Even if we answer “yes” to these questions and
others, it may be useful to note the types of rights at
stake. Our individual right to not be unjustifiably
harmed is a “negative” right, meaning that it requires
others from not interfering from an action [32]. But
any business-related rights seem to be “positive” rights
in that they require some good or service to be
provided [33]. As other examples, our right to free
speech is a negative right, since it requires that others
refrain from preventing us to speak our minds. In
contrast, our right to education is a positive right, since
it requires that we are provided with access to learning.
The relevance of this distinction is that negative
rights, it has been argued, are stronger than positive
rights [34]. Negative rights can be observed by, for
instance, simply not interfering with someone else’s
speech or not harming a person unjustifiably; no
action is needed. But positive rights are more difficult
to respect, since they require an action or series of
actions that may take some effort, for instance, hiring
teachers and building classrooms in order to provide a
public system of education. Because negative rights
take less effort to respect, it is less forgivable to
violate a negative right [35].
So even if the jury is still out on whether the cost to
business and industry is really worth the reduction in
EHS risk from stricter laws, there seems to be prima
facie reason to favor stricter laws on grounds that it
protects our negative right to not be harmed, which
must take precedent over any positive rights of the
nanotechnology industry – and it is not even clear what
rights are at stake in business and industry. Another
prima facie reason for some individuals may be based
on the aforementioned “people over profits” intuition.
We should note that the Other Harms Objection, by
itself, does not dispute the soundness or logic of the
stricter-law argument. Rather, it attempts to show that
P3 should not be accepted by shifting the focus to a
contest between benefits and harms, suggesting that
more damage than good will be caused by stricter

laws – which we are taking here to be, at best, an
open question or stalemate. Therefore, in our analysis,
the stricter-law argument appears to survive this
objection for the time being.
Further, we should also note here that the Selfregulation Objection and the Other Harms Objection
are incompatible, i.e., it is logically inconsistent to
hold that stricter regulation would hinder a fledgling
nanotechnology industry and that self-regulation is
the answer. Any self-imposed regulations nevertheless
represent more regulations than which currently
exists. But if it also believed that more regulation
would stunt industry growth, then self-regulation too
must impede industry progress – unless self-regulat
ing is a hollow or token gesture to appease regulators
and the concerned public.

(f) Future Harms Objection
If there is something reasonable, but not completely
convincing, about the Other Harms Objection, then
we can perhaps strengthen it here by pushing its timehorizon farther out, giving the argument more
consideration [36]. In doing so, we can suggest that
the preceding objection really did not consider
enough harms: it looked only at immediate or shortterm harms associated with stricter laws. But nano
technology is something that is forecasted to give
humanity profound benefits once it matures, and we
have yet to consider those goals in pursuing nano
technology. If we slow the industry down today, will
that prevent or hinder us from realizing these benefits
later – benefits that may plausibly outweigh EHS
risks that exist either today or in the future?
In the following, we will briefly present some of
the risks of moving too slowly in nanotechnology that
could be advanced by the Future Harms Objection,
which is not an objection we commonly see but is a
view held or implied by at least some nanotechnology
advocates. Taken together, these risks raise the stakes
involved in the stricter-law debate and may present a
more compelling challenge.

Economic Benefits
Nanotechnology is predicted to be a trillion-dollar
industry by 2015 [37]. While other countries –

including Brazil, China, South Korea, India, Israel,
Russia and many European nations – proceed at full
speed ahead, the US and any other nation may lose
significant economic benefits if it is not among the
leaders in nanotechnology. Depending on the scale of
economic benefits a nanotechnology industry or
industries can provide, many lives in the US may be
saved or made better, given that poverty is one of the
greatest determinant of life expectancy. Further, the
jobs that stricter US laws might deprive might not
simply be as a result of preventing new lines of
business from being created, but those are jobs that
now might be lost overseas, if another country or
countries take the lead and develop those commercial
innovations.
So the problem is that, while the US may pride
itself for being democratic in recognizing and consid
ering various interests among its population, from
business owners to environmentalists, other govern
ments may not be constrained by this guiding
principle and can push nanotechnology research and
products ahead, unencumbered by laws and regula
tions that may be stricter in the US. This may lead to
a loss of economic benefits on a larger scale than
previously considered, since in this scenario, jumpstarting the nanotechnology products industry then
would take more than firing the research and
manufacturing facilities back up; we would then need
to play catch-up in competing with other nations who
may have a significant, potentially insurmountable,
head start.

Military Implications
Nanotechnology promises to have significant military
applications, and indeed the military is a key driver of
nanotechnology research for many nations, including
the US. These predicted innovations include new
offensive capabilities (such as energy, robotic and
stealth weapons) and defensive (such as stronger
armor and better detection and jamming capabilities).
The military is also leading the charge to develop
medical advances that can be used on the battlefield
and better information systems used for intelligence
gathering as well as control and command centers.
With nanotechnology, production speed of military
assets can be increased to give a sizable advantage in
numbers alone, let alone their efficiency.

Nanotechnology, then, has the potential to take a
military force into the next generation and beyond.
And to the extent that a balance of military powers
around the world is needed to maintain some
semblance of global security or peace, nanotechnol
ogy could disrupt this balance, if it is developed
unevenly by current military powers. Never mind
how a nation would feel to lose its position or
influence in global affairs, a more worrisome question
to many is: what would be the effect of a non
democratic government having the most advanced
nanotechnology capabilities or developing them first?
Would that subject the nation to a foreign attack that
cannot be answered in kind? The potential loss of
security and lives needs to be added to the list of
harms, if stricter laws are also applied to or affect
military developments.

Reversing Environmental and Health Risks
The current debate over stricter laws is grounded in
concerns that nanotechnology products today may be
harmful to the environment and our health. But it is
also important to note that nanotechnology is also
expected to enable us to reverse many conditions that
afflict our environment and health. Nanotechnology is
being applied, for instance, to create better filters that
can provide clean water and air, which can help Third
World countries that need it the most.
Likewise, it can help ameliorate the large environ
mental impact of dirty industrial processes, including
those having to do with energy generation. New and
additional sources of energy, such as cost-effective
solar energy, will reduce or eliminate pressure on
current natural resources. Chevron recently an
nounced working on nanotechnology that can convert
tar found in sand into useable oil, which would serve
a dual purpose of cleaning up the environment [38].
In the distant future, nanotechnology may be able to
rebuild our depleting ozone layer or create nanobots
that can “eat” oil spills and other contaminants.
Beyond environmental benefits, nanotechnology is
being applied to agriculture to better feed the hungry
and to medicine to save more lives. So if we are
worried today about EHS risks in nanotechnology
products, we should also keep in mind the EHS risks
they could mitigate or solve with a sufficient time
horizon, including today’s risks.

Analysis
This objection is more robust that the preceding one
for a number of reasons. First, it adds longer-term
benefits (or harms from not pursuing nanotech) to the
list of those that should be considered for a more
complete picture of nanotechnology’s social and
economic impact. This, in turn, lends support to the
Precautionary Principle Objection: given these other
considerations, risk aversion seems less to be a
reasonable strategy, to the extent that potential
benefits seem to far outweigh potential harms in
aggressively pursuing nanotechnology.
But if this is such a compelling argument, why do
we not see more people (explicitly) advance it? One
reason seems to be that this sort of objection requires
making mid- and far-term speculations about nano
technology, which is always risky business, especially
if it also raises other ethical and societal concerns. For
instance, nanotechnology’s role in the military might
resurrect questions from the Cold War about mutuallyassured destruction and first-strikes. And many of the
more interesting predictions about nanotechnology
revolve around “molecular manufacturing” – an
advanced form of nanotechnology that involves
building designer objects one molecule at a time,
raising the possibility of creating virtually any object
we want, from food to weapons; however, this is very
much an area that many or most mainstream scientists
are reluctant to speculate about or openly dismiss
[39]. And if molecular manufacturing were more
widely predicted to be plausible, it may open a
Pandora’s Box of potentially disruptive and harmful
effects on global trade and therefore politics, all
complex questions that would then need to be
addressed. Again, all this is speculative, so it is
unclear what the possible far-term harms are and their
probability, even if we are confident about far-term
benefits.
The Future Harms Objection also forces us to
confront the unpleasant question of what the limits are
to our right not to be unjustifiably harmed: is it
morally permissible to risk the health of, say, 1,000 or
even 10,000 manufacturing workers and consumers
today, if we can save 100,000 or 1,000,000 other lives
later through the aggressive pursuit of nanotechnolo
gy? (These numbers, of course, are very difficult to
forecast and are used merely as examples here.) Also,
speaking of future generations, if federal funding is a

zero-sum game, i.e., funding nanotechnology now
takes away from the budget in another area, what
about lives today that could have been saved with the
funding currently diverted to nanotechnology, which
is more an investment in tomorrow? These are
questions that have no simple or universally-accepted
answer, much less one that a legislator would want to
tackle.
As such, this particular objection, as with the Other
Harms Objections, again depends on other factors,
namely rights, that cannot easily be reconciled on an
accounting ledger of benefits versus harms. So if we
are to extend the time horizon in the Other Harms
Objection to make the Future Harms Objection, then
it seems only fair that we must consider long-term
harms of not having stricter laws as well – again,
leading us back to a probable stalemate in the debate.
Though the Future Harms Objection appears to be
stronger than its predecessor, the numbers involved
are too difficult to quantify and forecast, as well as
difficult to process in the framework of human rights.
Further, though this objection is related to the Other
Harms Objection, the objectors seem to represent very
different positions: to the extent that mainstream
scientists and nanotechnology executives support the
Other Harms Objection, they may be reluctant to
speculate about nanotechnology’s promise beyond the
near future, fragmenting support for the Future Harms
Objection.
Of course, none of this speaks to the objection’s
soundness or logic. If we can reasonably project
overall benefits and harms across time, and if the
benefits sufficiently outweigh the harms, and if the
relevant human rights are not unjustifiably violated,
then the Future Harms Objection could be defensible.
But these variables are perhaps too speculative to nail
down with much confidence; therefore, the premise
P3 that it was designed to attack seems to survive, or
at least it has not been convincingly shown that it
should be rejected.

(g) Better-Us-Than-Them Objection
The final objection we will consider in this paper is
not one we see explicitly in nanotechnology-related
literature, but it is one we have heard anecdotally. It
might start by pointing out that many democratic
nations, such as the US, occupy a fortunate position in

the world where they can afford to be reflective about
matters of ethics and philosophy. We have that luxury,
but many other countries do not; they are embroiled
in a more desperate fight for survival. And if the
means became – and at some point will become –
available to them, chances are good that they will
pursue and exploit nanotechnology without such strict
regulations, if any regulations at all, to impede
research and development, perhaps for the base
reasons of national glory or military superiority and
even at the expense of their own citizens and
environment.
Do we really want nanotechnology to be dominat
ed by other nations of whom we are already
suspicious? Even if we can take the higher moral
ground and lay aside our national prejudices, it does
not change the fact that the other country will
probably not – and not care. Imagine then how the
world and beyond might look, if that foreign country
were to be the ones who control nanotechnology,
which could be the key to controlling literally
everything.
So if not only for this reason, we must keep our
lead in developing nanotechnology; we don’t want to
live on Planet Kim Jong-il. For the same reason, even
if we think our nano-future is bleak anyway, it could
be worse if the wrong nations were to be the ones
who shaped it the most.
So we must “own” nanotechnology and proceed
full speed ahead, without stricter regulations to
impede us; and when we do, we can take a rest and
become reflective again, returning our attention to
EHS matters. By deferring that moment of moral
questioning from now to then, we would then be in a
time and a place when we can do something about our
angst and any harm previously caused. We can give
nanotechnology to other countries, if we’re so
concerned about justly distributing tools that can help
humanity. We can try then to build that utopia we had
only read about. Even if we can’t do any of this, this
possible world seems much nicer that the one where,
say, a non-democratic country had its way with the
world, to the extent that our utopia is more utopian
and our values more valuable (to us at least).
That’s why we – and by “we”, I mean your
respective nation – need to dominate nanotechnology
research, even if some problems are caused along the
way, which appear to be smaller problems within a
much larger picture. Now, this is not the ideal

scenario, but it is a rationale one. We would rather
not be in a dangerous competition with another
country or countries; but the fact remains that we
are. And that’s the difference between philosophy
ethics and real-world ethics. Or so this objection
might go.

Analysis
As with the previous two objections, this one disputes
premise P3 in our formalized argument. It does not
deny that there may be EHS harms from nanotech
nology (i.e., it does not dispute conclusion C1), but it
asserts that EHS harms are not an unacceptable
consequence if stricter laws would cause greater
harm, thereby questioning conclusions C2 and C3.
In fact, it argues that greater harm would be caused by
not aggressively pursuing nanotechnology and allow
ing other nations to take the lead; therefore, EHS
harms are the lesser of two evils and should be
preferred and accepted over the alternative.
This is a very pragmatic – and forgivable –
position to take on the role of ethics in society and
especially in a democracy. But where risk-aversion
may not always be the best strategy as the previous
objection asserted, being pragmatic also might not be
the best course of action or the right thing to do.
For instance, consider the ban on human cloning
that exists in some countries. It would be pragmatic to
argue that at some point, somewhere in the world,
someone will clone a human being. If this is an
inevitable event, then it would be better if we (our
nation) were the ones who cloned a human first; we
could at least ensure that safeguards were in place,
that the clone could be treated humanely, that we
would put any knowledge we gained to good use, etc.
But if this line of reasoning fails to work in human
cloning (as well as other cases such as an arms build
up), then it seems to suffer from the same condition
when applied to nanotechnology.
Further, as we discussed in the previous two
objections, this objection ignores the role of human
rights, the rights of citizens today to not be harmed; or
it at least is willing to sacrifice these rights for a future
benefit, which is a controversial position to adopt.
Finally, there is no guarantee or even reasonable
assurance that if we pursue nanotechnology without
restriction, then our nation will have the lead; it is

very much still an open field. So without some
safeguards in place at the national level if not also
globally (such as treaties to limit the threat of
mutually-assured destruction, in the case of an arms
build-up), there is still potential for catastrophe to
occur, especially if we move forward recklessly. And
a more sensible or alternative solution to the situation
posited by the objection seems to be that we should
advocate greater regulations and oversight – or at
least cooperation as a first step – on a global scale, if
stricter regulations only at the national scale would
impede that particular nation.
The belief that something is inevitable, whether
nanotechnology or Armageddon, does not seem to be
a good enough reason to rush towards it, especially if
we can buy some time by moving a bit slower –
precious time needed to perhaps develop safeguards
to mitigate any associated negative impacts.

An Interim Solution?
A full defense or analysis of the preceding objections,
particularly the last three, is beyond the scope and
goals of this paper, but there seems to be enough
reason to believe that they are not entirely without
merit. At the same time, there does not (yet) seem to
be enough there to believe that the stricter-law
argument should be rejected. So an interim or
compromise solution may be needed now to cover
both contingencies.
Moreover, even if stricter laws and regulations are
ultimately justified, there are good reasons to think
that they cannot be enacted anyway, or at least face
stiff resistance with lawmakers and regulatory agen
cies, particularly in the US. Clarence Davies, the
author of the Woodrow Wilson International Center
report that sparked today’s stricter-law debate, even
admits that: “In the U.S. political system, it has never
been easy to pass new laws regulating commercial
products. In the current political climate, it is close to
impossible” [40]. Changing regulatory policy is
likewise a formidable challenge.
That is to say, the US legislative and regulatory
systems are notorious for being complicated and
mired in debate, so barring an urgent need – which
many believe has not yet been established for nano
materials – it does not seem optimistic to think that
new laws or stronger regulations can be enacted in the

near future, even if needed. But perhaps we can
suggest a simpler solution here.

Running Faster to Catch Up
There is a sense with many that nanomaterials found
in today’s products have not been established yet as a
clear and present danger, which may be part of public,
legislative and regulatory hesitation to propose dra
matic changes to current rules. Under this reasoning,
rushing new laws or regulations through until more
facts are revealed may be the same kind of mistake as
rushing nanotechnology products into the marketplace
without fully considering their impact on health,
environment or even society and ethics.
But we can acknowledge this position while at the
same time be prepared to adopt new regulations if and
when more studies show that nanomaterials are
indeed harmful and that new laws are warranted.
That is to say, even if we are not ready to call for
stricter policies now, we can and perhaps should have
a contingency plan or “Plan B” developed, discussed
and ready to be implemented, should more compel
ling evidence be presented in favor of stricter laws.
(The trick here, of course, is to specify the details of
such a “Plan B”, which too is beyond the scope and
goals of this paper.) If we adopt a wait-and-see
attitude towards nanomaterials, then it is incumbent
upon us to aggressively conduct safety testing.
However, a critical point in the nanotechnology
regulatory debate is that current testing methods may
be inadequate against nanomaterials and products, so
it is not clear that more testing will get us far if we do
not improve those methods; therefore, it is also
incumbent upon us to aggressively develop new
testing methods in order to conduct EHS testing
effectively.
The proposed solution, then, is rather than slowing
the nanotechnology industry down through more
regulations, as some claim they would, regulatory
planning as well as EHS testing and research need to
run faster and catch up – just as experts have called
upon ethics to do [41]. Starting a serious dialogue
today with policymakers would help compensate for
the slow time-to-action for creating new laws,
particularly if we are just idly waiting for more
research to come out that would compel action. And
continuing to support and fund research into nano

material safety is critical to evolve the safety stan
dards that exist in current laws and regulations.
Progress is being made in this area, as the aforemen
tioned UCLA researchers last year, and others since
then, showed by developing a new testing model to
evaluate the safety and health risks of engineered
nanomaterials.
Further, if we can improve testing methods, then
we may not need new laws or stronger regulations, at
least in the meantime. Where current laws and
regulations require materials to pass certain safety
and health standards, we may be able to simply
evolve and raise those standards as scientific under
standing and testing methods evolve, as opposed to
erecting new regulations. This would only require that
current policies recognize and utilize the latest
advances in safety and health testing, which is a
reasonable expectation. (Note: The WWICS report
criticizes some of the relevant regulations as being
unclear or having loopholes or failing to apply to
critical industries, such as cosmetics, so improved
materials testing admittedly would not solve those
deficiencies. However, those problems exist indepen
dently from nanotechnology: they are not specific to
nanomaterials and have been issues for some time
now. As such, they present a broader challenge in the
field of a regulatory reform and therefore are not so
much addressed in our discussion here.)
Without developing new testing methods, it does
not seem that new or stricter laws can address risks
posed by nanomaterials anyway, if current methods
fail us. Therefore, incorporating these new standards
is the salient point in the recommendation to create
stricter laws and regulations. Or to put it another way,
if current testing methods are inadequate to show that
nanomaterials are harmful, and we know that they are
harmful at least in some cases, then any new or
stronger law that is still based on these current
methods does not seem to add much value, just more
barriers to business.
For instance, would harsher civil and criminal
penalties or more detailed environmental impact
reports cause company executives to act any differ
ently, if no different methods were available to
support or refute previous claims of product and
materials safety? They would most likely run more of
the same tests to arrive at the same conclusion. This
would seem to be an instance of GIGO or “garbage
in-garbage-out”, where without new testing methods,

we are using inadequate processes that inevitably
generate inadequate conclusions.
If it makes sense to push harder for better testing
methods, that still leaves a problem of a stop-gap
measure in the meantime, since new funding takes a
significant amount of time to disburse and research
often proceeds slowly as well. One solution is to
accept the proposal for the nanotechnology industry
to regulate itself, as an alternative to doing nothing.
To repeat a key point in our discussion of the Selfregulation Objection above, the objection itself does
not dispute the soundness of the stricter-law argu
ment. In fact, it agrees that more regulations are
needed, but that the nanotechnology industry should
be the one to create and implement them, since the
industry knows nanotechnology the best and has a
direct interest in sustaining the field.
At best, self-regulation will eliminate EHS risks in
nanotechnology to at least some degree; at worst, it
seems that it would not create any additional EHS
risks but at least represents a good-faith effort to
mitigate those risks. If and when governmental
regulations are needed, that process can be informed
by the prior exercise of self-regulation.

Open Questions
Of course, the interim solution proposed above is a
conceptual framework, and many real-world details
still need to be worked out. For instance, are there any
examples of “Plan B” approaches to suggest that such
a proposal can actually work? What are the specific
steps we would need to take to strengthen preregulatory planning, methods for testing materials,
and toxicology testing? Do we need (paradoxically) a
legal basis for ensuring that this greater focus on EHS
risks and testing actually occurs, for example, by
stipulating that some percentage of all nanotechnolo
gy research funds will go towards these areas?
How do we know that more and faster study of the
EHS aspects of nanotechnology can keep up with the
full-throttle research and development (R&D) and
commercialization of nanotechnology in not just the
US but also abroad? And how much more funding is
needed for ethics and risk to catch up with R&D? If
other nations do not focus as much on EHS risks,
would the US (or any other nation that adopts such an
interim solution) need to compensate with even more

funding, given that nanotechnology ultimately knows
no national boundaries and impacts the entire world,
especially given a global economic ecosystem?
And if additional funding is warranted, where
would that come from? Would it be diverted from
other programs that are working on current cures for
current ills, outside of nanotechnology’s risks (which
seem to be future risks, as opposed to actually
harming people or the environment right now)?
These are all good questions, and we do not intend
to present a complete solution here; but we merely
hope to provide a starting point for discussion
towards a feasible solution while the nanotechnology
regulation debate rages on. Moreover, to the extent
that nanotechnology is a highly interdisciplinary area,
we would expect that collaboration among law
makers, scientists, ethicists, economists, and so on
would be needed to account for the complicated
issues arising from nanotechnology – more than just
what a few ethicists can achieve here.

Conclusion
Though we would like to avoid the difficult compar
ison of nanotechnology’s possible benefits with its
possible harms in this paper, it seems that what is
known now – and not just speculation, albeit educated –
is that nanotechnology products today provide only
incremental value or changes to existing products, i.e.,
they represent “better mousetraps” and not yet the
revolutionary products predicted. On the other hand, the
risks that nanomaterials pose today may be severe,
possibly including death of animals and people.
Therefore, we conclude that there is reason to think
that current laws do not fully account for nanotech
nology, if potentially-hazardous nanotechnology
products are reaching the marketplace. Nanotechnol
ogy, though technically not a “new” science, never
theless introduces new materials that may defy current
testing and safety standards not designed with nano
sized particles in mind. And research already indi
cates that nanomaterials are hazardous to the
environment and human health, which is made all
the more troubling considering that some nanomate
rials come into direct contact with human beings,
such as that in sunblock rubbed into one’s skin.
But here’s an important caveat: even if current laws
are inadequate, would new or stronger laws be

enough to fill that gap? In other words, the regulatory
debate has been centered on the question of whether
we need more regulation; but the more relevant
question may be, why are current laws ill-equipped
to deal with nanotechnology? The answer, or at least
the complete answer, might not be that we are missing
some law or process, but that the testing methods and
standards built into existing laws have not caught up
with the pace of nanotechnology.
While cleaning up and streamlining our maze of
regulatory processes would certainly be helpful in
general, unless we can quickly advance methods to
more effectively test for environmental, health and
safety risks in nanomaterials, new or stricter laws
may serve to only slow down the industry through
procedural changes rather than to improve our
evaluation of nanomaterials through substantive or
qualitative changes in how we approach such
materials.
So our suggestion is, rather than causing the
nanotechnology industry and business to slow down
now – which risks being a knee-jerk reaction to create
more laws in the face of a problem – other areas can
be stimulated to quickly catch up. Regulatory preplanning needs to catch up with the growing number
of studies that confirm nanotechnology’s EHS risks,
in case new laws are ultimately needed. And testing
methods and standards need to catch up to better
confirm the safety of nanomaterials, which could
occur within the framework of existing laws, and
screen out the products that are hazardous to our
environment, health and safety. At the same time, we
can take the nanotechnology industry up on its offer
to regulate itself; there does not seem to be any harm
in that, especially if the alternative is to do nothing.
There are several advantages of such a solution.
First, while benefits today in nanotechnology (i.e.,
better sunblock, better sports equipment, better pants,
etc.) might not justify its risks, this might not remain
the case in the future. And overburdening the
nanotechnology industry with regulation, though well
intended, may ultimately cause more damage than
good. So we need to find a reasonable balance that
responsibly promotes innovation in nanotechnology
while at the same time safeguards EHS interests – in
addition to other interests that nanotechnology may
run up against as the field matures, such as privacy.
Second, a compromise may be needed anyway,
once we recognize that there are significant chal

lenges in creating new laws or regulations, and that
there is presently little public awareness of these
issues that might apply pressure to policymakers.
Neither business interests nor EHS interests will be
going away any time soon, nor do we really want
either to. But we have seen the undesirable effects of
placing too much focus on either business or EHS, so
finding a balance between these legitimate interests is
needed, particularly in a democracy that values a
diversity of opinions.
Third, such a solution may serve to accelerate the
industry responsibly – giving us new confidence that
our nanoproducts are safe or identifying the ones that
are not. Research into new testing methods would
also give us new insights into nanomaterials, perhaps
even new applications.
In Greek mythology, Prometheus – the titan of
forethought – gave fire to mankind as a gift (though
he was summarily punished by the gods with
unending torture). In nanotechnology, we also have
a rare gift that can enable us to profoundly change our
world. But just as we should not play with fire before
we learn how to control it or its risks, commonsense
requires the same for nanotechnology. With more
effective regulations and new safety testing methods,
we can help ensure that nanotechnology does not burn
our world down.
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